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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR
WASHINGTON

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October 16, 1958

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I refer to my letter of June 4, 1958 transmitting for your information a United States Working Paper presented on April 29, 1958 to the Four Power Working Group on German Reunification as well as an Interim Report of the Four Power Working Group dated May 16, 1958.

Following further discussions the Four Power Working Group prepared a report for the European Security Committee of NATO regarding European Security and Germany, which the Committee reviewed and submitted with minor changes as an interim report to the North Atlantic Council on August 22, 1958. The North Atlantic Council discussed the report on October 9, 1958. All delegations appeared to agree that it would be useful as a reference paper to be consulted in discussion of pertinent aspects of East/West negotiations. I am transmitting herewith a copy of this interim report for your information.

In the course of the discussions in the Four-Power Working Group certain differences of view concerning policy towards European security and Germany were disclosed. These differences were summarized in a secret report which the Working Group submitted to the Four Governments on July 18. A copy of this report is also transmitted for your information.

Sincerely yours,

G. Frederick Reinhardt

Enclosures:

1. Interim Report to the North Atlantic Council, August 22, 1958.
2. Report to Governments of Four-Power Working Group, July 18, 1958.

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

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STATE review(s) completed.
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procedure for German reunification is put forward for the first time. Second, an offer is made of security arrangements which would enter into force on the reunification of Germany irrespective of the choice made by an all-German Government with regard to its alliances. (Annex III)

3. It will be seen from the annexed papers that there are a number of problems on which no conclusions have yet been reached. It may be possible to resolve some of these problems in the course of, or as a result of, discussions in the Council. Especially in view of the current Soviet intransigence over German reunification other problems will have to be left until the prospects of a conference with the Soviet Government become actual, and it is possible to foresee more precisely the circumstances and the form in which the Western proposals are likely to be put forward. Moreover, there will be certain problems, e.g., the exact nature of the limitations of forces and armaments in Europe, on which it is unlikely that any decisions will be feasible in advance of genuine negotiations with the Soviet Government. Finally, the character of any specific proposals which could be envisaged would be greatly affected by the degree to which progress had been made in the field of disarmament.

The Committee therefore suggests that it is not desirable that NATO governments should attempt at this time to reach any final decision as to the precise form or content of the Western position on European security and Germany for use at an eventual conference with the Soviet Union, but should aim rather at achieving the broadest area of agreement on the premises on which such a position should be based, as outlined in the three papers annexed. Meanwhile governments will no doubt wish to continue to study the outstanding problems indicated in Annex II with a view to further discussion of them at the appropriate time.

(Signed) A. CASARDI
Chairman

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING SECURITY MEASURES AND SOLUTION OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN EUROPE

I - MILITARY ASPECTS

A - Arguments advanced in favour of disengagement

- The Soviet threat in Eastern Germany would be weakened;

- In the event of the Rapacki proposal being adopted a larger area would come under control in the East than in the West (Western Germany, Soviet Zone of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia);

- The possible dangers of direct contact between the forces of the East and West would be removed.

B - Drawbacks and risks

(a) In the event of complete withdrawal of non-German forces:

(1) The NATO defence forces would have to fall back on too small an area, and this would presumably imply new strategic concepts for Atlantic defence and the withdrawal of United States forces;

(2) The force of the deterrent would be weakened;

(3) A neutral zone would tend to develop and this would reduce the possibilities of taking a retaliatory atomic action in the event of aggression;

(4) There would be an incentive for the aggressor in respect of a neutralised zone.

(b) In the event of a partial withdrawal of forces (e.g. the Rapacki plan applying to atomic weapons):

- the existing NATO defensive system would be weakened and probably radically changed with the same consequences as those described above.

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C - Proposed 'improvements' in the Rapacki plan

(a) by the offer to prohibit strategic nuclear weapons only

It is clearly difficult to distinguish between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Furthermore, should such measures be the subject of agreement between the East and West, they would seem to be foreshadowing the establishment of a special zone of the Rapacki type, whose creation would thus be very appreciably facilitated.

(b) by fixing maximum levels for the forces stationed in the zone

In view of the limitless depth of territory in the hands of the Soviet Union as compared with the narrow margin of action available to NATO, the balancing of forces would only be acceptable over the largest possible area, i.e. within the framework of general disarmament negotiations, or in conjunction with the reunification of Germany.

D - Control problem

(1) It is impossible to exercise control over atomic stockpiles.

(2) On the one hand, there would be advantages in locating all targets in the zone, but on the other hand this may benefit the aggressor, who would have the advantage of surprise.

(3) Extensive control of all military installations would harden the pattern and tend to neutralise the vital points of the Western defensive system, whereas the greater part of the Soviet bloc forces stationed outside the zone would escape control.

E - Special case of a control zone to prevent surprise attacks

- Aerial inspection over a European zone may be a means of detecting long term preparations but not preparations for a surprise atomic attack, since the latter will occur suddenly and can be launched from a point outside the perimeter of the zone.
- Aerial inspection is necessarily combined with ground controls which have the aforementioned drawbacks. It is therefore only acceptable if it applies to a broad stretch of Soviet territory.

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To sum up, the chief drawback of regional limitations is that they would alter the map of the original theatre of operations in a way prejudicial to the Western powers owing to the lack of depth in their territory in Europe and would cause the Allied defence system to fall back and thus compel the Alliance to abandon its present strategic concepts.

II - POLITICAL ASPECTS

A - Aims of the USSR in proposing disengagement within the status quo

Is the aim,

(1) to ease the USSR's relations with the satellites?

(2) to consolidate its zone of influence?

(3) to prepare further expansion?

1. Mr. Khrushchev, both by his words and actions, makes it clear that he intends to maintain his domination intact (Hungarian crises, Polish crises, Yugoslav crises). He has arrogated to himself a permanent right to intervene, even in the event of evacuation. Under these circumstances, the presence of control teams in the popular democracies does not fundamentally change the situation (example of North Korea after 1953).

2. The Soviet zone of influence in Europe includes the so-called DDR, which has designs on the whole of Germany. This is not a closed zone but serves as a springboard for Soviet influence through the Soviet Zone of Germany into Western Europe.

3. The aims of the Soviet programme are:

(a) progressively to dismantle the Atlantic defence system (Rapacki plan);

(b) to impose recognition of the status quo, with a view to discouraging public opinion in Western Germany and other countries;

(c) to isolate the German Federal Republic through the proposed confederation of the two Germanys, which is designed to break the Federal Republic's links with its Western Allies, whereas the Soviet zone would leave the Warsaw Pact but would remain under Communist domination.

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The Soviet programme thus tends to tip the balance of political and military forces in Europe irrevocably in favour of the USSR.

B - Political conditions under which disengagement would be possible

Agreements concerning security measures in Europe could be envisaged under certain conditions, provided they were based on sound political situations and were likely to lead to a real improvement in relations in Europe. They therefore cannot include either explicit or implicit recognition of the status quo and must depend on any advance which may be made towards a solution of the political problems of Europe, with respect to the reunification of Germany and the consequent loosening of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe.

Under these conditions it would appear necessary to stand by the principle that the conclusion of security agreements in Europe cannot be envisaged independently of the solution of the political problems.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND GERMANY

An Analysis of Problems Involved in the Formulation of a Western Position

PART A

I. General Considerations

1. There are three basic principles, accepted by all NATO governments, which should govern the examination of Soviet proposals and the preparation of a Western position on European security and Germany. These are:-

(a) The military security of members of NATO and the solidarity of the Alliance must be maintained;

(b) The risk of war by miscalculation must not be increased;

(c) the solution of political problems, e.g. German reunification must be safeguarded and in no way prejudiced.

II. Soviet Aims

2. The aims of the Soviet Union in Europe are:-

(a) the recognition by the West of the political status quo, in order to consolidate its hold on the satellites;

(b) the weakening of the links between the Federal Republic and the West, with a view to the eventual absorption of the whole of Germany into the Soviet bloc;

(c) the disruption of the Atlantic Alliance and the withdrawal of US forces from Europe, with the object of establishing Soviet supremacy on the continent.

III. Soviet Proposals

3. Comments on Soviet proposals are already available in the text of the instructions to the Western Ambassadors in Moscow for their discussions with Mr. Gromyko. The principal objections to the proposals on European security are summarised below.

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4. Nuclear-free zone

(a) The denial of tactical nuclear weapons to NATO forces in Germany would leave these forces at a serious disadvantage in face of the much greater number of Soviet forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany and elsewhere in Europe. This would not be redressed by establishing an approximate balance of conventional forces in the zone, because of the unlimited depth available to the Soviet Union compared with the narrow area of maneuver available to NATO on the continent of Europe.

(b) The development of long-range missiles renders quite inadequate, from a military point of view, the removal of nuclear weapons from a narrow area as a measure intended to increase security. Nor could any reliance be placed on a Soviet assurance that, in the event of war, nuclear weapons fired from outside the zone would not be used against targets in the zone.

(c) There are, as the Soviet Government itself has stated, no adequate means of controlling stocks of nuclear warheads.

5. Reduction of foreign forces in Germany and elsewhere in Europe

(a) The proposal that a reduction should be made by one-third of all non-German forces in Germany and that the troops made redundant should return "to the limits of their own national frontiers" is manifestly unfair to NATO, since the bulk of NATO's land forces are stationed in Germany. A large proportion of these are American forces.

(b) The further suggestion for "the complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty," to be discussed "at the next stage" is also unacceptable, since it would involve the break-up of NATO while the Soviet forces would still be readily available to threaten and operate in Europe from the Western frontier of the Soviet Union.

(c) These proposals would impair the effectiveness of the deterrent through the weakening or destruction of the NATO shield.

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6. Non-Aggression Pact between Members of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact

(a) Without any accompanying progress towards the settlement of political problems, such a pact covering pledges already given under the UN Charter would give an illusion of relaxation of tensions without making any real contribution towards eliminating the sources of tension.

(b) Moreover, the Soviet proposal is based on and, as is its intention, would tend to perpetuate the status quo and to raise the question of recognition for the so-called DDR.

(c) "The Soviet Government would attempt to use the existence of such a pact to bring pressure on the West to curtail the development of effective defensive arrangements."

7. Creation of a German Confederation

(a) Soviet and East German proposals for German 'confederation' contain no specific proposals for reunification; they are designed to perpetuate the Communist regime in the Soviet Zone and to give this regime (and thereby Moscow) a veto power over the policies of the Federal Republic.

(b) Acceptance of the Soviet proposal that the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone regime should work out the solution of the German problem themselves would negate four power responsibility for reunification. It is obvious that the Soviet Government must be a party to any solution of this problem.

8. Conclusion of a Peace Treaty

(a) A peace treaty can only be concluded with a freely elected all-German government which is entitled to speak for the whole of the German people. Thus reunification through free elections must precede negotiations on a peace treaty.

(b) The Soviet peace treaty proposal, which contemplates the Soviet one regime as a participant in negotiations, is a device for perpetuating the status quo.

All these proposals are consistent with, and designed to promote, the Soviet aims described in the preceding section. The objections to them, from the Western point of view, are likely to be as equally applicable in negotiations at a conference as in preparatory talks in Moscow.

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IV. Considerations Bearing on the Formulation of the Western Position

9. Despite the obvious conflict between Western and Soviet aims, the question arises as to whether there is a possible area for negotiation of limited military arrangements in Europe, which could lead to the establishment of more favourable conditions for a general European settlement, including the ending of the division of Germany. In other words, would it be possible to come to a limited understanding with the Soviets in the area of force and arms limitations or with respect to the deployment of forces in Central Europe which would not prejudice Western objectives and would in fact forward them?

10. Limitation of Forces.

In considering this question, several basic problems arise from the Western viewpoint. As noted in the preceding section, given the limited area for the deployment of Western forces as compared with the depth available to the Soviets, withdrawals of forces from Central Europe would work exclusively to the advantage of the Soviets. The same consideration applies to force limitations based on the present line of demarcation between East and West. The NATO shield forces at present are at best sub-marginal. To carry out their mission effectively, they require strengthening both in numbers and armaments. In these circumstances it is difficult to conceive of an agreement on force levels in Central Europe which could be negotiated with the Soviets without damage to the maintenance of an effective Western defence posture.

11. Extension of the area of force limitations to a greater depth, i.e. to Soviet home territory, would be unlikely to be acceptable to the Soviets without corresponding limitations in American territory. This would involve considerations of general disarmament rather than European arrangements.

12. Demilitarised Zones

The creation of a demilitarised zone on each side of the line of demarcation has from time to time been suggested as a means of reducing the danger of outbreak of a conflict in Europe. But such a zone might invite local hostile action which present force deployments serve to deter and thus increase the risk of war by miscalculation. In fact, forces have been deployed for some years facing each other in Central Europe. There is no evidence that this fact in itself has given rise to dangers which could be reduced by minor deployments.

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13. Armament Limitations

An agreement to exclude certain types of armaments from a specified area also involves major problems. The main objections to a denuclearised zone have been noted in the preceding section. Limitation on means of delivery, while presenting possibilities of control and inspection, involve serious difficulties in the field of dual purpose weapons. Efforts to distinguish weapons as to function, e.g. offensive from defensive or strategic from tactical, involve serious problems of definition. A major disadvantage to the West of all such limitations would be to restrict the ability of NATO to adapt its defences to changing requirements resulting from technical developments while leaving the Soviets free to exploit the advantage which they enjoy from their greater depth.

14. Political Considerations

The Soviet Union has shown a strong interest in the establishment of a special military status for Germany. It constantly employs a variety of means in an attempt to achieve this objective, but is unwilling to take any steps toward solution of the German question. Any security or disarmament agreement based on the status quo, even if very modest in scope, which would apply to the Central European area, and to Germany in particular, would support these tactics.

15. The main danger of such an agreement would be that it would almost inevitably lead to a permanent control system of a discriminatory character. Moreover, during the negotiations the Soviets would certainly ask for inclusion of the whole of Germany in the area of control. This would have the result that, at a very early stage of the East-West negotiations, a very important part of the NATO defences in Europe would come under Soviet inspection without comparable compensation in the East.

16. The area involved would be precisely that in which the major political problem in Europe arises. This fact raises directly the question of how the participation of the Soviet Zone regime in the signature and implementation of the agreement could be avoided. On the basis of past experience, there is no doubt that any Soviets will use any appropriate situation to assert the sovereignty of the "DDR" in order to achieve its recognition by the Western Powers. Contacts with the Soviet Zone regime would in fact be unavoidable in the context of an agreement of such a limited geographical scope.

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17. An agreement of such a character, unaccompanied by any progress toward a settlement of the political problem of the division of Germany, would also have an adverse effect on the psychological situation in both parts of Germany. The population of the Soviet Zone in particular would conclude that Western efforts to end the division of Germany had finally failed.

18. Conclusions

When all due allowance is made for public opinion, it is nevertheless difficult to see what advantages could be obtained from negotiating force and armament limitations or deployment limitations on the basis of the present demarcation which would justify these risks. There is no reason to believe that agreements of such a character would bring about the basic change in Soviet policy which would be involved in relaxing their hold on the Soviet Zone of Germany and the satellites. The Soviet leaders have made it abundantly clear that they have no intention of making any such change in policy. They have also made it clear that they reserve a permanent right of intervention in the satellites, even in the event of previous, partial or complete withdrawal of their forces. Moreover, such agreements could lead to a false sense of security in the West and a false belief that tension had been reduced, which would merely invite Soviet pressure for further concessions. We would thus risk being drawn into a process in which the Soviets might be able to press us into a piecemeal dismantling of our defence position without any significant change in their basic position.

19. The risks involved in such agreements from the Western viewpoint are unacceptable except in conjunction with the withdrawal of Soviet forces at least from the Soviet Zone of Germany. This contingency is only likely to arise in the context of the reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to the West.

PART B

V. Main Elements of a Western Position

20. It follows from the foregoing that the Western Powers should seek a settlement with the Soviets in which any agreed military arrangements would be combined with an acceptable settlement of the problem of the division of Germany. They should therefore maintain the position that there can be no genuine relaxation of tension in Europe in the absence of such a settlement and that measures aiming at European security would be illusory unless this condition is fulfilled.

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21. The proposals made by the Western Powers at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Meeting envisaged such a settlement. These proposals did not, however, go into detail and left the position on a number of subjects for development in actual negotiations. Moreover, the proposals left unclear the extent to which they were dependent on a reunified Germany becoming a member of NATO.

22. Reunification of Germany

The Western objectives can be attained only if an all-German government is genuinely free. There is no reason to alter the Western position that reunification should be brought about by free elections and that the creation of a responsible and free all-German government is a prerequisite to the negotiation of a peace treaty.

23. Relationship between Reunification and European Security

The Geneva proposals provided that the reunification of Germany and the measures proposed under the heading of European security should enter into force concurrently in stages. What this staging would be was not specified. It would be desirable [illegible] any new proposals [illegible] the relationship between the entry into force of European security arrangements and the process of reunification.

24. Germany and NATO

The imposition of a neutralised status on Germany would be unacceptable. The government of a reunified Germany should not be subjected to restrictions on its foreign policy or required to sever the ties which have been established between the Federal Republic and other Western countries. On the other hand, the provisions of the European security arrangements should be drawn in such a way as to be independent of the decision of the all-German government whether or not to join NATO. Additional assurances to the Soviet Government which would be effective only in the event of a reunified Germany joining NATO such as Article 8 of the Geneva draft "Outline of Terms of Treaty of Assurance" (obligation to react against aggression) should therefore be separated from the main Western proposals for European security arrangements.

25. European Security Arrangements

The Geneva proposals envisaged that there would be both political clauses (renunciation of the use of force, withholding of support from aggressors, and provisions for consultation) and agreed military arrangements. Further elaboration of the proposed political clauses does

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not appear necessary at this time. Various aspects of possible military arrangements are examined below. The Geneva proposals provided for such limitations in a zone of comparable size, depth and importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and its Eastern European neighbours.

26. Force and Arms Limitations

Decisions regarding the possible size of such a zone and the nature of acceptable limitations present major military and political problems. Unless all of Germany were included, the size of the total German military establishment would not be affected. Could a proposal for the inclusion of part of Germany only be presented in such a way as to be independent of Germany's choice regarding alliances? If all of Germany were included, what provision should be made regarding foreign forces? A difficulty arises from the fact that the provisions of the agreement have to be worked out in advance of Germany's choice with regard to alliances. If ceilings were fixed on Soviet and Western forces in Germany, this would tend to imply that Western forces should be withdrawn as Soviet forces are withdrawn.

27. In addition to Germany, what other countries could be included with a view to achieving the balance envisaged by the Geneva proposals? The Rapacki plan suggests a Soviet willingness to equate Germany with Poland and Czechoslovakia. From the Western viewpoint, it would be desirable to include a larger area in the East, but this might give rise to Soviet demands for the extension of the area westward.

28. The fixing of force and armament levels presents a variety of problems. The general concepts of the WEU Treaty might be applicable, but the arrangements in the treaty are based to too high a degree on the assumption of the good faith of the signatories to be acceptable in an agreement with the Soviet Government. The levels of forces which might be contemplated and the character of the armament limitations which might be acceptable are dependent to a high degree on the situation which would exist outside the zone of limitation. In the absence of an agreement on a first stage of disarmament involving limitations on nuclear and conventional capabilities, the USSR would be free to maintain a vast military establishment which would continue to be a threat to Western Europe.

29. Under the circumstances, it seems doubtful whether it would be prudent for the West to envisage making more specific proposals in this regard until such time as there is more prospect for genuine negotiations with the USSR and the actual negotiating situation can be envisaged. It would be desirable, however, that governments should continue to give study to these problems.

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30. Special Measures Regarding Eastern Germany and Adjacent Areas

The Geneva proposals provided that, in addition to a zone of force and armament limitations, there might be special measures regarding the disposition of forces and installations in the parts of the zone lying closest to the line of demarcation. In the Berlin Declaration of July 29, 1957 the Western powers stated that they were prepared, as part of a mutually acceptable European security arrangement, to give assurance that, in the event of a reunified Germany joining NATO, they would not take military advantage as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

31. The implication of the statement in the Berlin Declaration is that the main body of NATO forces would not move into the present Soviet Zone of Germany if it were evacuated by Soviet forces. The question arises whether the concept of a thinned out or demilitarised zone suggested by the Geneva proposals should be utilised as a means of giving effect to this statement, and, if so, in what way.

32. One possibility would be to confine forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany and a comparable area of Poland and Czechoslovakia to indigenous forces. Additional limitations could be placed on the size and character of these forces and the nature of their armament. Any such proposal would require Soviet forces not only to withdraw from Germany but also from an area extending deep into Poland. However, since it is not suggested that there be any similar provision for the exclusion of non-German forces from Western Germany, it may be argued that this is asking so much of the Soviets as to appear unreasonable to Western opinion.

33. In considering the question of limitations on German forces stationed in the present Soviet Zone of Germany, it is necessary to recall that this area will include the capital city of Berlin and that Berlin is only 50 km from the Oder-Neisse line. Limitations on German forces in this area would raise problems of internal security and would leave the area, including the capital, subject to threat from forces stationed on the other side of the Oder-Neisse line. Limitations on the armaments available to the forces in the present Soviet Zone of Germany which would result from the special measures discussed above, would have implications with respect to the ability of these forces effectively to carry out a defensive mission both on the ground and in relation to air defence.

34. Finally, the establishment of an inner zone of "special measures" within a zone of force and armament limitations would greatly complicate the problem of control and inspection.

35. The disadvantages of a zone of special measures are therefore quite considerable. Furthermore, it is difficult to consider the concept apart from that of a zone of force and arms limitations. It would appear desirable, therefore, not to put forward proposals of this character at this time.

36. In these circumstances, it would be desirable to deal with the question of giving effect to the Berlin Declaration (that the Western powers would not take military advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the event

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event of a reunified Germany choosing to join NATO) independently of the question of a zone of special measures." A formula on this subject could be cast either in the form of an undertaking given solely by the West (i.e. as envisaged by the Berlin Declaration) or as a mutual undertaking to be included in the European Security Agreement. In the latter case, it would be proposed that the Soviets should for their part undertake not to move their forces westward in the event of unified Germany joining the Warsaw Pact.

37. The freedom of choice to be given the all-German government of course embraces the possibility of joining the Warsaw Pact. However, there are psychological and political drawbacks to casting Western proposals in such a form as to imply that this possibility is a real one. It might be preferable to leave the Western offer as a unilateral one, and to deal with it under the heading of additional undertakings to be given by the West in the event of Germany joining NATO.

38. On the other hand, the idea of some special form of control along both sides of the German eastern boundary has value and should not be completely discarded at this time. This idea could be retained in the Western proposals in some general formulation.

39. Prevention of Surprise Attack

The Geneva proposals contained a provision aimed at the prevention of surprise attack in the form of an overlapping radar screen. Since that time, considerable progress has been made in the development of proposals in this area. The USSR has pressed for the establishment of a European zone of inspection, but on a basis unacceptable to the West. The Western disarmament proposals of August 1957 contained an offer of a board European zone in the event of agreement either on a US-Canadian-USSR zone or an Arctic zone. The Western proposals envisaged a zone running from 10° West to 60° East, but offered to consider a smaller zone.

40. The question arises whether it would be desirable to offer a European zone of inspection against surprise attack, independently of agreement on other zones in the context of a European security agreement linked with German reunification. In such an event, the area should obviously be as broad as possible and should include a significant segment of Soviet territory.

41. A European zone would not be effective against an all-out nuclear attack, which would be launched from outside it. Its value would probably be limited to ground attack, a contingency which might be served by the measures of control and inspection required in connection with force and armament limitations. The decision whether or not to include it in the outline plan can probably only be taken in the light of the development of negotiations.

42. The Soviets apparently attach some importance to a European zone, although perhaps more for political than military reasons, i.e. maintenance

of the

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of the status quo. This Soviet political objective would not be served by inclusion of such a zone in arrangements linked with the reunification of Germany. However, the inclusion of such a zone in our European security proposals could be represented as being responsive to the Soviet interest.

43. On the other hand, the interest of the West is inspection arrangements which would afford a real degree of assurance against surprise attack. Separation of the European zone from other zones would tend to reduce the pressure on the Soviets to agree to an Arctic or even larger zone.

VI. Proposed Outline Plan for Presentation of Western Proposals

44. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it would be possible to sketch out the general manner in which the Western position could be presented. There is hereto annexed an "outline plan" for German reunification and European security which could provide a basis for the Western proposals on European security and German reunification, together with an introductory memorandum which contains a general statement of the proposed Western position, explains the plan, and sets forth the additional assurances which the West would be prepared to offer in the event of reunified Germany joining NATO. The principal new element in these proposals is that the European security arrangements would enter into force irrespective of the choice with respect to alliances made by the all-German government.

VII. Tactics

45. Whether or not it will be desirable to put forward at a summit meeting a proposal of the character suggested cannot now be determined. From the viewpoint of Western opinion, it would be desirable to clarify our position, particularly on such matters as to the relationship between our European security proposals and German membership in NATO. On the other hand, it seems likely that the Soviets will reject the proposal out of hand, and we should soon find ourselves under pressure from segments of Western opinion to make new proposals. It may therefore be preferable for the Western representatives to set out the Western position in somewhat more general terms, orally or in writing. This decision can only be made in the light of the future development of our exchanges with the Soviets and the actual situation in a conference.

46. Regardless of what tactics are pursued, it will be essential to have agreement among the NATO governments on the substantive issues involved. Consideration should therefore be given to the acceptability of the outline plan and the points on which no conclusions have been reached should continue to be the subject of study.

47. Study should also be given to the question of what the Western representatives at a conference should do if a specific Western proposal on European security and Germany is presented and is rejected by the Soviets. Western opinion would no doubt continue to hope that further efforts would be made to resolve the impasse. Could any more limited proposals be made

which would

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which would be consistent with our principles as set forth at the beginning of this paper? Would it be useful to seek some method for maintaining continuing contact and discussion with the USSR with regard to these matters? Or should one look elsewhere for a means of breaking the deadlock? The answers to these questions depend probably in large measure on the development of discussions in the field of disarmament and it may be premature to consider them at this time. In any event, except for the first, they raise considerations of a broader character than European security.

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INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM AND OUTLINE PLAN FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION

The Directive issued by the four heads of government at the Geneva Conference of July 1955 contained two principal agreements on European Security and Germany. On the one hand, the Foreign Ministers were instructed to consider various proposals "for the purpose of establishing security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all nations and their inherent right to individual and collective self-defence." On the other hand, the heads of government recognised their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, and agreed "that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." So far these agreements have not been carried out.

Political tensions are the main cause of insecurity. The removal of these tensions can create the mutual confidence which is the essential condition of a lasting settlement. Such tensions arise from the existence of outstanding political problems. To be effective, measures in the field of security must be accompanied by the settlement of these political problems. The main political problem in Europe is the division of Germany. The governments of France, the UK and the US are ready to join in the establishment of security arrangements in Europe in connection with the solution of this problem.

For this purpose the governments of France, the UK and the US propose the annexed Outline Plan for German Reunification and European Security Arrangements. These arrangements would be included in two agreements. One, dealing with the reunification of Germany, would be concluded by the four powers responsible for this subject. The other would be an agreement on European security arrangements. This agreement would be concluded by the four powers and other governments concerned and would be adhered to by the all-German government after its establishment. These agreements, which would be concluded and would enter into force concurrently, would be implemented progressively in the manner indicated in the Outline Plan. They would be fully effective when the all-German government had itself acceded to the agreement on European security. They would provide the framework within which the reunification of Germany would take place, irrespective of any decisions made by the all-German government about its foreign policy.

In their proposals for the reunification of Germany, the governments of France, the UK and the US have been guided by the following basic principles. First, the German people should have the right freely to choose the government under which they are to live. This right should be exercised by means of free elections throughout the whole of Germany. Second, there should be no discrimination against a reunified Germany. The all-German government formed as a result of free elections should be free to choose its own foreign and domestic policies and would be responsible for the conclusion of the peace treaty.

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The proposals of the three powers on European security arrangements envisage an interrelated set of arrangements designed, in conjunction with the settlement of political problems, to contribute to the creation of confidence and mutual security. The arrangements would include provisions for agreed levels of forces and armaments, which would be subject to effective measures of supervision and inspection. These levels should provide an appropriate balance which would contribute to the security of all the signatories. Special arrangements regarding deployment might be envisaged in certain frontier areas. The agreement would contain assurances against aggression and/an undertaking to withhold support from aggressors. An important aspect of the agreement would be the provisions for consultation with respect to its implementation. (1)

These proposals are in no way dependent on Germany becoming a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty. Should the all-German government decide to adhere to this Treaty, the three powers would be prepared to join with the Soviet Union and any other parties to the European Security Agreement in additional mutual obligations. They would propose that each party should agree that an armed attack in Europe by any party, which is also a NATO member, against any party which is not a NATO member, or vice versa, would endanger the peace and security which is the object of this agreement, and that all the parties would then take appropriate action to meet that common danger.

In their present form, the annexed proposals are not more than an outline and the details will have to be worked out in negotiations. The three governments hope that the Soviet Union will accept the Outline Plan as a basis for such negotiations and will agree to the immediate appointment of representatives to draw up the necessary agreements. They are convinced that, if progress can be made on this basis, it will promote a European settlement which will contribute to the attainment of a just and lasting peace.

(1) See footnote to paragraph (2) of General Revisions in the Outline Plan.

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The following is an outline of the plan for German reunification and the establishment of European security arrangements, details of which would be included in agreements to be negotiated between the powers concerned:

I.
Initial Security Undertakings in Europe

On entry into force of the agreements, each party would undertake:

(1) to settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which it was involved with any other party;

(2) to refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(3) to withhold assistance, military and economic, to an aggressor; and

(4) to consult with the other parties regarding the implementation of the agreements.

II.
All-German Elections

Three months after the entry into force of the agreements, free elections under international supervision would take place throughout Germany for an all-German national assembly.

III.
The National Assembly

The national assembly would proceed as quickly as possible with the drafting of a constitution and with the formation of an all-German government under it.

Pending the formation of an all-German government the national assembly could set up a provisional all-German authority charged with assisting the assembly in drafting the constitution and with preparing the nucleus of all-German executive organs. The provisional all-German authority could initiate preliminary negotiations for a peace treaty.

The national assembly would determine how the powers of the Federal Government and of the authorities in the Soviet zone should be transferred to the all-German government and how the two former should be brought to an end.

/Measures

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IV.

[Measures Against Surprise Attack] (1)

[A system of inspection to guard against surprise attack would be established over an area in Europe which should be as broad as possible.]

V.

Levels of Forces and Armaments

At this stage provisions for levels of forces and armaments would be introduced. These provisions could not be effected until machinery for control and inspection had been established and the all-German government had acceded to the European security agreement. Further study is required as to the basis on which these levels would be established or the area in which they would be applied.

VI.

The All-German Government

The all-German government would have full freedom of decision in regard to internal and external affairs, subject to the rights retained by the four powers.

The all-German government would have all the rights of individual and self-defence recognised by the United Nations Charter.

The all-German government would be responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of the peace treaty.

The all-German government would have authority to assume or reject the rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and of the Soviet Zone of Germany under treaties of alliance and arrangements subsidiary thereto concluded by them. Provision could be made for the continuation in force of other treaties and agreements of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone pending their application to the whole of Germany or their denunciation or modification. (2)

(1) No conclusion has been reached as to whether it would be desirable to put such a proposal forward in the European security arrangements separately from the other zone with which a European zone was linked in the Western disarmament proposals of August 29, 1957.

(2) The question of the continuation in force of other treaties is under study.

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General Provisions

(1) No party to the agreement on European security would continue to station forces on the territory of any other party without the latter's consent and, upon the request of the party concerned, any party would withdraw its forces within a stated period.

(2) [Whatever decisions the all-German government might take with regard to the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany, non-German forces stationed in Germany would not be advanced beyond the area in which they were stationed at the time of entry into force of the agreement on European security.]

[Should the all-German government decide to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, the three powers would be prepared to give an assurance that they would not advance their forces in Germany beyond the area in which they were stationed at the time of the entry into force of the agreement on European security.] (1)

(3) Pending the conclusion of a peace treaty and subject to (1) above, each of the four powers might exercise with respect to the national assembly, the provisional all-German authority and the all-German government only those of its rights which related to the stationing of armed forces in Germany, the protection of their security, Berlin, the reunification of Germany and the peace settlement (2).

(4) Decisions of the national assembly, the provisional all-German authority and the all-German government in fulfillment of the agreements would not require the approval of the four powers and could not be disapproved except with the agreement of all four powers.

In order to conclude agreements on the above lines, the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose that the four powers should appoint representatives:

(1) If this formulation were adopted, it would be included in the introductory memorandum rather than the Outline Plan.

(2) Certain legal aspects of this paragraph continue under study.

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(1) To draft, in consultation with German experts, a German electoral law and to make recommendations for the supervision of the elections in order to ensure that they take place in conditions of genuine freedom.

(2) to draw up together with representatives of other powers concerned a plan for the establishment of levels of forces and armaments, including measures for effective supervision and control; and

(3) similarly, to draw up a plan for the establishment of a system of inspection to guard against surprise attack.

Separate groups should be set up for each of these purposes with instructions to submit their reports to the governments within a stated period. These reports would provide the basis for agreements on the reunification of Germany and on European security arrangements.

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Report of the Four-Power Working Group on German Reunification

Task of the Working Group

The Working Group met again in Paris from July 8 till July 18. Its specific tasks at this session were:-

(a) to discuss the answers to the questions on the Outline Plan raised in the Interim Report produced in May;

(b) to draft an introductory memorandum to the Outline Plan; and

(c) to prepare draft paper on European security and Germany as a basis for discussion in the NATO European Security Committee.

Questions in the Interim Report

2. All members of the Working Group reserved their Governments' final positions on the questions and on the Outline Plan and agreed to refer their conclusions back to their Governments after the discussions in the Working Group and subsequently in the European Security Committee. It was agreed that in any case the final decisions about whether the Outline Plan should be put forward at a conference with the Soviet Government, and, if so, at what stage and in what precise form, would have to be made by Governments in the light of developments at the preparatory talks and at any subsequent conference. The answers to the questions, which are given below, are all subject to these general reservations.

3. The general scheme of the Outline Plan

All members of the Working Group agreed that the general scheme of the Outline Plan was acceptable as a basis for an initial Western position, subject to agreement on the detailed contents of the Plan.

4. Measures against surprise attack

It was agreed that there were two hypotheses which could be considered:

(a) On the first hypothesis, a European zone of inspection against surprise attack could be linked with a USSR-Canadian-United States zone or with an Arctic zone, as in the Western disarmament proposals of August 29, 1957. In this case a European zone would be independent of other security arrangements in Europe and would not be linked with the solution of political problems.

(b) On

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(b) On the second hypothesis, a European zone of inspection could be taken out of the disarmament context, and inserted into the process of German reunification/ European security, as had for example been envisaged in the first draft of the Outline Plan.

The French representative expressed the view that each of these two hypotheses could constitute a basis for study. As for the concept of a European inspection zone against surprise attack considered separately, it should remain reserved for the time being.

The British representative considered that, while it would be preferable to retain the link in the first hypothesis, there was advantage in including a European zone in the Outline Plan since the zone was relevant to the context of European security and would add a new element to the Western proposals.

The United States and German representatives thought that there were disadvantages in severing the link between a European and either the USSR-Canadian-United States or an Arctic Zone. The German representative pointed out that measures against surprise attack were one of the few points on which there was a possibility that agreement might be reached at a conference and that we should avoid prejudicing this possibility by making a European zone dependent on German reunification, which had not been a condition of its inclusion in the August, 1957, disarmament proposals.

The United States and German representatives could not therefore agree to the inclusion of a European zone at this time in the Outline Plan.

5. Zone of limitation of forces and armaments

All members agreed that some provision relating to levels of forces and armaments could be envisaged as part of the European Security arrangements to be established in connection with German reunification, and that these provisions could enter into force irrespective of Germany's choice about alliances.

The United States representative considered that:-

(a) any armaments limitations should be quantitative, not qualitative;

(b) in fixing force ceilings there should be no distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous forces.

The German representative proposed that reference should be made to "levels" rather than to "limitations". In the light of the American statement that armaments limitations should be quantitative, not qualitative, "levels"

would

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would cover the Western intentions in a more suitable way. The German representative was unable to accept any specific reference to a "zone" at this time, and could not therefore agree to the formula in Section V of the Outline Plan. He stated that in his Government's view, for tactical reasons, it was not desirable to consider at present any precise area to which the provisions might apply unless or until there was any real prospect of serious negotiations on German reunification. He pointed out that the question of "zones" and their extent would depend also on the progress made in the field of disarmament negotiations and could not therefore be considered in isolation from the possible establishment of a zone of inspection against surprise attack. The adoption of the "Rapacki Area" or a similar area could be interpreted as Western support for the Soviet proposal of a small European zone of inspection against surprise attack.

The French, British and United States representatives pointed out that the Western Powers were already committed on the record to the offer of a "zone of limitation", e.g. in the Geneva proposals of 1955. It would be difficult to go back on this offer which was the kernel of the Western Proposals on European Security and which was included in the existing instructions to the three Ambassadors in Moscow. The United States and British representatives considered that the zone could apply to Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The French representative suggested that Hungary might be added or that it might be possible to avoid the inclusion of the whole of Germany. While appreciating the desirability of not putting forward specific proposals regarding the extent of a zone of limitations or the character of the limitations within the zone prematurely from a tactical point of view, the United States, British and French representatives thought that the omission of the concept of a zone would give rise to serious difficulties

6. "Special Measures"

All members agreed that the idea should be expressed that, if Germany joined NATO, NATO would not take military advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The United States representative considered that "special measures" should apply to both sides of the Eastern frontier of Germany, as in the 1955 proposals, and that the German proposal that, whatever choice of alliances Germany made, non-indigenous forces in Germany would not be advanced beyond the area in which they were stationed was undesirable because it might be taken to imply that the possibility that Germany might join the Warsaw Pact was a real one.

The British and French representatives pointed out that the advantage of the German proposal was that it could be included in the Outline Plan since it would be applicable whatever Germany's choice of alliances.

It was

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It was agreed that mention could be made in the introductory memorandum of the possibility of special arrangements in certain frontier areas.

7. German accession to the European Security Agreement

All members agreed that provisions for levels of forces and armaments should not be put into effect until the all-German Government had acceded to the European Security Agreement and that the right, which the all-German Government would acquire through accession, to request the withdrawal of foreign forces should be a strong inducement to the all-German Government to accede.

8. Exercise of Reserved Rights

All members considered that the disapproval of decisions of the all-German bodies should be by unanimous vote of the Four Powers instead of by majority vote as at present provided.

9. Introductory Memorandum for the Outline Plan

The Working Group considered that, in addition to a general explanation of the basis of the proposals in the Outline Plan, the introductory memorandum should include a repetition of the obligation to react against aggression which was included as point 8 in the 1955 Treaty of Assurance; and which, since it was dependent on German membership of NATO, it would not be appropriate to include in the Outline Plan.

In addition

(a) the undertaking that, if Germany joined NATO, NATO would not take military advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and

(b) the proposal for special arrangements in certain frontier areas

should be included in the memorandum if corresponding provisions were not included in the Outline Plan.

A draft memorandum was prepared, together with a revised version of the Outline Plan for consideration by Governments and the European Security Committee. Copies are annexed.

10. Report to the European Security Committee

The Working Group prepared draft papers relating to European security and Germany which they proposed could be used as a basis for discussion in the NATO European Security Committee.

11. Fall-back

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11. Fall-back position

The British representative suggested that, if, as was generally assumed, the Soviet Government refused to negotiate on the basis of the Outline Plan, the West should consider what their next step should be. If the West had nothing further to propose under the heading of European security, in face of the various objectionable Soviet proposals with which they would be faced, the effect on Western and "non-committed" public opinion might be unfavorable. It might be considered whether there was any proposal which could be made independently of German reunification but which would not prejudice the basic Western policy of linking reunification and European Security. One possibility which we examined was the idea of a zone of inspection against surprise attack in Europe in isolation, i.e. not linked either to the Arctic Zone or to German reunification, as in the Outline Plan.

The French representative agreed that this problem might be studied but considered that it was too early to raise it in any NATO body. In any case a European inspection zone against surprise attacks considered separately could be acceptable only if it covered a substantial portion of Soviet territory.

The United States representative considered that examination of a fall-back position should be carried out in relation to the whole scope of the negotiations with the Soviet Union and that it would not necessarily be desirable to discuss a fall-back in relation to one item on the agenda, European Security, only. In particular he drew attention to the fact that there were disadvantages in severing the link between the European zone and an Arctic or a USSR-Canadian-United States zone.

The German representative thought that it was premature to discuss the question of the inclusion of a European zone of inspection in the Outline Plan, still more the idea of such a zone in isolation. He doubted whether this would be an appropriate fall-back position.

12. Reserved Rights and German Treaty obligations under the Eden Plan

The United States representative circulated papers on each of these subjects, proposing modifications of the provisions of the Eden Plan. It was agreed that further study of the United States proposals should be made.

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13. It will be seen from the above report that there are differences between the four positions on two important elements in the Outline Plan, namely, the zone of inspection against surprise attack and the zone of limitation of forces and armaments. The zone of inspection against surprise attack was not included in the 1955 proposals. The zone of limitation was an integral part of the 1955 proposals which has been repeated frequently since, and was the central feature of the Western position on European Security. It was agreed that the four representatives could not usefully take matters further on these two points pending further decisions by Governments.

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